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ESSAY 
GLOBAL WARMING AND THE PROBLEM OF POLICY 
INNOVATION: LESSONS FROM THE EARLY 
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 
BY 
CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER* 
When it comes to influencing government decisions, special interests 
have some built-in advantages over the general public interest. When the 
individual members of special interest groups have a good deal to gain or 
lose as a result of government action, special interests can organize more 
effectively, and generate benefits for elected officials, such as campaign 
contributions and other forms of political support. They will seek to use those 
advantages to influence government decisions favorable to them.  
The public choice theory of government decision making sometimes 
comes close to elevating this point into a universal law, suggesting that the 
general public interest can never prevail over powerful special interests. In 
the period of the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, Congress enacted 
numerous significant environmental laws, laws that continue to form the 
backbone of federal policies toward environmental problems. These laws 
were truly innovative in their policies and their designs, and they pitted the 
general public interest in improving environmental quality against powerful, 
special interests. In each case, the general public interest was able to prevail.  
This policy “window” did not stay open for long. It was quickly 
succeeded by an extended period in which enacting additional innovative 
statutes has proven nearly impossible, which continues to this day. Yet we 
need innovative approaches to address continuing and emerging 
environmental problems more than ever. This is self-evidently true with 
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respect to the problem of global warming and climate change. The questions 
worth asking are whether we can identify the factors that once made policy 
innovation possible in the late 1960s and early 1970s and if those factors can 
be produced once again.  
For the public’s David to be able to stand up against the special interest 
Goliaths, a broad base of the public must first be mobilized, and then that 
mobilization must be sustained, which typically occurs when the public 
embraces a sense of great urgency. Urgency can be generated when the 
public appreciates that failure to address a problem threatens them or their 
loved ones with significant harm. Media attention plays a key role in creating 
the public’s awareness of any urgent problem. These factors can succeed in 
putting general concerns of the public on the public agenda, at which time 
acceptable proposals for workable solutions need to be available. When the 
first window for policy innovation opened up in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, each of these favorable factors was present for many of our 
conventional pollution problems. At the same time, the strength of the special 
interests was at a low ebb. 
This Essay argues that under current circumstances, the conditions for 
policy innovation are not yet as favorable as they were in this earlier period. 
Strong presidential leadership may be capable of altering those conditions, 
but as yet the public’s concern about the adverse effects of climate change 
does not appear to have achieved the same strength or intensity as 
comparable concerns over conventional pollution problems had earlier.  
 
 
In this opening decade of the twenty-first century, our nation and the entire 
globe faces a daunting array of environmental problems. They present some steep 
hills to climb, with disruptive climate change looming as the largest. This Essay 
concentrates on that problem, but we do well to remember that this is far from the 
only severe environmental problem that we face. For example, the World Health 
Organization estimates that each day 3000 African children are dying of malaria 
and other water borne diseases, diseases that the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) member countries have conquered but that 
still hold the less developed countries in a death grip.1 If you want to gain some 
sympathy for why the developing economies of the world are reluctant to agree to 
limits on carbon emissions to help address disruptive climate change, you need 
look no further than their desire to raise their standard of living so that they can 
enjoy some of the basic indicators of well being that Americans take for granted.  
The OECD countries have their own persistent problems, of course. Just take 
the United States. Forty years after Congress enacted the Clean Air Act2 about 130 
million Americans live in counties that are not meeting the health-based ambient air 
 
 1 Brett Parris, In the Eye of the Storm, OECD OBSERVER, Nov. 2001, at 40, 40–41; Press Release, 
World Health Org., Malaria Is Alive and Well and Killing More than 3000 African Children Every Day 
(Apr. 25, 2003), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2003/pr33/en/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2009). 
 2 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006). 
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quality standards for ozone.3 Endocrine disruptors remain perplexing; we know that 
persistent organic pesticides and other varieties of chemical compounds interfere with 
the human endocrine system, but we are still groping for reliable ways to test for and 
classify these environmental stressors.4 Asthma incidents have increased despite the 
air being generally cleaner due to efforts under the Clean Air Act, and we are not 
entirely sure why.5 The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is 
moving toward lowering the ambient standard for lead by nearly 90% because 
consensus science ties lead exposure to IQ and other cognitive defects at much lower 
levels than the current standard.6 EPA’s most recent assessment of the nation’s water 
quality, based on state reported data, lists just under half of the assessed rivers and 
lakes as “impaired,” which is EPA’s lowest classification.7 States only assessed about 
19% of their rivers and 37% of their lakes,8 so we are uncertain whether the problem 
is much worse than this or not—but it is probably no better.  
Adequately addressing each of these problems, as well as others, may stretch 
beyond the existing environmental legal framework’s capabilities. At the same 
time, however, the prospect of significantly new and innovative measures to cope 
with this daunting agenda seems to be quite dim. For the past twenty or thirty years 
the United States has been experiencing a deep partisan divide on environmental 
matters,9 making constructive progress difficult to achieve. The practical political 
obstacles that environmental legislation confronts are often are accompanied by a 
theoretical explanation. The theory of public choice, very popular within the 
academy, sketches a view of politics and policy in which pushing environmental 
legislation through the legislature is practically impossible.10 Public choice theory 
 
 3 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Green Book: 8-Hour Ozone Nonattainment Areas, 
http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/greenbk/gntc.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2009). 
 4 See John P. Myers, Sheldon Krimsky & R. Thomas Zoeller, Endocrine Disruptors—A 
Controversy in Science and Policy: Session III Summary and Research Needs, 22 NEUROTOXICOLOGY 
557, 557–58 (2001). EPA proposed plans in draft form for testing endocrine disruptors in December of 
2007, but the plans are still awaiting final agency action. Bush to Leave Office with Key EPA Proposals 
in White House Review Limbo, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., Jan. 16, 2009, at 10. 
 5 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Measure D1: Percentage of Children with Asthma, 
http://www.epa.gov/envirohealth/children/child_illness/d1-background.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2009) 
(summarizing studies proposing various explanations for the increased incidence of asthma). The 
number of children reporting an asthma incident in the last twelve months nearly doubled between 1980 
and 1995. Id. The National Health Interview Survey estimated that 9.3%, or 6.8 million children, had 
asthma in 2006. Id. 
 6 See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Lead, 73 Fed. Reg. 29,184, 29,187, 29,199 (May 
20, 2008). 
 7 See 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b) (2008) (listing the reporting requirements for states under the Clean 
Water Act); EPA Water Report May Spur House Action on Nonpoint Source Pollution, INSIDE EPA 
WKLY. REP., May 18, 2007, at 16 (describing EPA’s water quality assessment for 2007, which indicates 
45% of the nation’s assessed streams and rivers, 47% of assessed lakes, and 32% of assessed estuary 
square miles are impaired). 
 8 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: REPORT TO CONGRESS 7, 
11 (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/305b/2002report/report2002pt3.pdf. 
 9 See generally MICHAEL E. KRAFT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND POLITICS 104–07 (4th ed. 
2007) (describing the political divisions over environmental policy during the last several decades). 
 10 See Michael A. Livermore, Reviving Environmental Protection: Preference-Directed Regulation 
and Regulatory Ossification, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 311, 345 (2007); Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational 
Choice Versus Republican Moment—Explanations for Environmental Laws, 1969-73, 9 DUKE ENVTL. 
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views legislation as a good to be sold in the political market to the highest bidder.11 
It is a marketplace skewed in favor of smaller groups of economically powerful 
interests who stand to lose a great deal—and hence have great reason to oppose 
legislation—and biased against much larger groups of individuals, each of whom 
has a comparatively small amount to gain. The smaller group can organize more 
easily, can assemble the necessary resources to fight legislative battles more easily, 
can contribute to legislators’ campaigns more effectively, and will win all the major 
legislative battles waged between it and the larger, but more diffuse group. 
According to the public choice logic, “regulatory policy outcomes that deliver 
broad benefits to unorganized citizens at the expense of organized interest groups 
would run contrary to the theory’s clear expectations.”12 
This description fits most environmental legislation to a tee. Take air quality 
legislation as an illustration. Most air quality laws aim at benefiting a great many of 
us by making the air a little healthier for each of us to breathe. On the other hand, that 
legislation imposes substantial costs on public utilities, automobile manufacturers, 
energy companies, steel mills, and the like. Public choice theory posits that these 
concentrated groups of economically powerful industrial and commercial interests 
will prevail in a straight up contest with us air-breathing citizens.13 
Public choice is onto something important; Bismarck warned us that sausage 
making and legislation making are not pretty sights, and a great deal of what makes 
the latter seem so distasteful is due to the influence of special interest groups.14 But 
public choice also leaves out some important things, too. As an overall account of 
actual political decision making, it is just wrong. 
Evidence of the problems with public choice accounts of environmental policy 
making can be found in abundance in the massive amount of environmental policy 
innovation that Congress passed in the early days of the modern environmental era. 
In a tremendous burst of lawmaking between 1969 and 1980, Congress enacted 
several dozen significant federal laws to cope with just about all the major 
environmental problems as they were understood at that time. During this span of 
 
L. & POL’Y F. 29, 30 (1998) (“Rational choice has been the hottest stock in the political science portfolio 
for the past 30 years.”). 
 11 For summaries of the brand of public choice described in this paragraph, see STEVEN P. CROLEY, 
REGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 15, 
19–21 (2008); Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 
61, 65 (1992); and Schroeder, supra note 10, at 34–35. 
 12 CROLEY, supra note 11, at 23. The bleak picture of public choice depicted here has been 
influential, but there are also less bleak—and more plausible—variants of public choice. For a more 
realistic articulation of the political market place from a public choice perspective, see generally 
Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz & Robert N. Stavins, The Positive Political Economy of 
Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 89, 90–116 
(Arvind Panagariya, Paul R. Portney & Robert M. Schwab eds., 1999) (analogizing political outcomes 
to market principles and predictions). 
 13 CROLEY, supra note 11, at 23. 
 14 While the famous remark about laws and sausages has been widely attributed to Otto von 
Bismarck—see, for example, then-Judge Scalia in Community Nutrition Institute v. Block, 749 F.2d 50, 
51 (D.C. Cir. 1984)—in fact, the occasion when Bismarck uttered the remark has never been confirmed. 
See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 88 n.2 (1999). Some have attributed it to 
Benjamin Disraeli and Winston Churchill. Id. 
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just a little over ten years, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,15 the 
Clean Air Amendments of 1970,16 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972,17 the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972,18 
the Endangered Species Act of 1973,19 the Safe Drinking Water Act,20 the Toxic 
Substances Control Act,21 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,22 
and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
of 1980,23 among others, all came into existence.  
These laws are something of an embarrassment to public choice theory’s 
bleak account of how narrow special interests conquer the general interest. The 
environmental laws pitted the interests of the general public against the interests of 
concentrated, economically powerful industries, sometimes arraying just about all 
of the economically powerful industries in the American economy against citizens 
who wanted cleaner air, cleaner water, and fewer toxic products—and yet they 
were enacted.24 
The environmental laws passed in the early 1970s defy conventional public 
choice wisdom. And yet, there they are. Public choice is not wrong in thinking that 
special interests have advantages compared to diffuse interests, but it is wrong in 
thinking that those advantages are always going to be decisive. Special interests can 
be defied; the general interests of the public at large can be enacted—but only 
under certain conditions. When those conditions are present, a policy window 
opens up in which environmental measures aimed at benefiting the general public 
and working for the greater good can be enacted.  
In the 1970s, such a policy window opened up, but it did not stay open for long. 
Environmental policy innovation slowed to a crawl around 1976.25 While the 
notoriety of Love Canal helped generate enough momentum for the Superfund 
legislation in 1980,26 Congress has produced remarkably little innovative 
environmental legislation since.27 As a result, we are living with environmental 
 
 15 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970). 
 16 Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970). 
 17 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). 
 18 Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (amending the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act). 
 19 Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973). 
 20 Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974). 
 21 Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976). 
 22 Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976). 
 23 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980). 
 24 For good accounts of the political dynamics of this period, see generally RICHARD LAZARUS, THE 
MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 94–97 (2004) (describing the opposition to the new environmental 
laws passed in the 1970s); MARY GRAHAM, THE MORNING AFTER EARTH DAY 34–50 (1999) 
(describing the social and political dynamics between 1960 and 1970 that led to the creation of multiple, 
major environmental laws); and ROBERT PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER & 
JAMES P. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 88–98 (5th ed. 2006) 
(describing the various stages in the development of environmental law in the United States). 
 25 See generally LAZARUS, supra note 24, at 93–94, 97 (describing how industry’s efforts to oppose 
environmental laws had little “perceptible impact on environmental laws themselves during the 1970s”). 
 26 See RICHARD ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES 247–48 (1999). 
 27 See generally LAZARUS, supra note 24, at 106, 110 (describing the limited number of significant 
environmental laws enacted in the 1980s, while noting that “Congress substantially amended in the 
1980s the Clean Water Act; [the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
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statutes and regulatory structures that are getting old, exhibiting signs of their age, 
and perhaps are just not up to the tasks lying ahead. Many people fervently hope that 
we can open a second policy window for innovative approaches to our remaining 
environmental challenges. What conditions do we need to open that window? We can 
learn some things by studying the conditions that created the last one.  
Major policy initiatives fare better if they exhibit two features. First, the idea 
behind the initiative and the proposed method for implementing it need a strong basis 
in sound public policy. Is the policy a good response to a problem sufficiently 
important to justify government action? Having a good idea is always the best 
starting point, but it is almost never enough. If you are the President of the United 
States, there are things that you can accomplish by Executive Order with the stroke of 
a pen, without having to cope with Congress or even your own sometimes recalcitrant 
bureaucracy.28 Presidents can even act in the face of a disapproving public, although 
they do not go this route too often because it can extract a high price from the 
President’s ability to accomplish other parts of his agenda. In any event, Executive 
authority can only go so far; much innovating in the area of environmental policy is 
going to require involvement by Congress, and in the congressional environment, 
even the very best of ideas is going to need further assistance.  
The second feature for successful policy innovation is this further assistance. 
There needs to be enough active and enduring support to push through the barriers 
that stand between many good ideas and their enactment into law. Sometimes a 
relatively small group of very motivated people can be successful in the legislative 
arena, shepherding a good idea to final passage.29 When important interest groups 
oppose policy change because of the costs that it will impose on them, however, 
and when those groups are themselves highly organized and alert to threats to their 
well being, it takes something powerful to break the policy monopoly that such 
groups can enjoy.30 
When organized interests sense that legislative innovation will cause them 
losses, one can be confident that they will strongly resist. This, too, is characteristic 
 
Act]; the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act; the Safe Drinking Water Act; and the Toxic Substances Control Act”). Although legislative 
innovation slowed, existing environmental statutory regimes continued in place throughout this period. 
See id. at 116 (discussing environmental law’s “surprising persistence” throughout the 1980s despite 
political opposition from Reagan). 
 28 For treatments of the President’s capacities to act independently of the Congress, see generally 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587–89 (1952) (“In the framework of our 
Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that [the 
President] is to be a lawmaker.”); Graham G. Dodds, Executive Orders from Nixon to Now, in EXECUTING 
THE CONSTITUTION 53, 53–66 (Christopher S. Kelly ed., 2006) (describing various presidents’ use of 
“executive orders for a variety or purposes, often with little explicit constitutional or legislative authority”); 
and Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2346–52 (2001) (describing the 
president’s power relative to the administrative branch and Congress). 
 29 See, e.g., Daniel Lipinski, Navigating Congressional Policy Processes: The Inside Perspective on 
How Laws Are Made, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 337, 347–52 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. 
Oppenheimer eds., 2009) (describing how the author and a colleague shepherded legislation mandating 
energy-efficient light bulbs in federal buildings through the congressional process). 
 30 FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 8–9 (1993) (“[T]here is no reason to assume that those originally favored by the political 
system will not be able to use their superior resources and political connections to their advantage.”). 
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of environmental legislation; it is nearly impossible to produce major domestic 
policy change in fields like energy and the environment without redistributing to 
some extent, and sometimes to a major extent, competitive advantages and 
disadvantages. If the groups that the law will adversely affect are concentrated and 
well organized, they will have great motivation to resist change, as well as 
sophisticated means for doing so. Sophisticated opposition ruined President Bill 
Clinton’s effort to reform the health care system in 1993. Clinton’s bill would have 
effected major changes in health care and health care delivery in this country,31 and 
for every group the bill benefited there was another that the bill harmed. In the end, 
the failed legislation proved once again that it is much easier to block legislative 
change than it is to push it through.32 
The defeat of Clinton’s health care plan was a victory for oppositional interest 
groups, and illustrates the public choice prediction that in struggles to enact 
legislation, concentrated economic interests will prevail. Once again, although it 
over-reads the evidence to generalize that concentrated interests will always 
dominate efforts at legislative change, they will always be formidable opponents. 
No one denies that special interests have distinct advantages in the battle over 
legislative change, nor that legislative change is particularly difficult to achieve 
where powerful interests stand to lose. Utility companies, energy companies, steel 
mills, hospitals, and insurance companies carry a great deal of clout. While this 
means that the broad public interest faces stiff opposition, the evidence from the 
early environmental era also stands as testimony for the ability of the broad public 
interest to overcome that opposition—if conditions are ripe. One crucial condition 
focuses on garnering active and enduring support. 
Thus, in conditions where interest groups are as free to organize as the rest of 
us, an excellent innovative environmental idea is only the beginning. The idea 
needs powerful support. Some of that support may come from advocates of good 
government who endorse and support an idea because it seems likely to advance a 
vision of the good society that they embrace. Against powerful entrenched 
interests, though, that typically will not be enough. For ideas that stand to benefit 
the wider society as a whole, a natural candidate for broadening the base of support 
is to find a way to enlist broad public support. If that can be successfully done, 
“[e]ven where a political battle pits economically powerful Goliaths against much 
poorer Davids, the victory of Goliath is not to be taken for granted.”33  
It can be very difficult to mobilize enough Davids, however. When each 
person in a large group has relatively little at stake, group inertia is high and group 
effectiveness will not be commensurate with its size. In order to overcome this 
inertia, someone has to get the attention of individuals in the group and then to 
retain and sustain their interest long enough to form and maintain a winning 
 
 31 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, The States’ Stakes In Clinton Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 
1993, at E5. 
 32 Any careful account of the Clinton health care reform effort identifies a number of factors 
contributing to its failure, but clearly the opposition of well-financed interests was chief among them. 
See, e.g., HAYNES JOHNSON & DAVID S. BRODER, THE SYSTEM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF POLITICS AT 
THE BREAKING POINT, at xi (1996) (“[A]s our narrative will show . . . responsibility [for the health care 
bill defeat] rested on weaknesses in the Democratic Party, defections among its allies, and especially on 
the ability of well-financed opponents to fan public fears of Big Government and bureaucracies.”). 
 33 BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 30, at 9. 
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coalition. This often means a period of concerted public education, as those 
dedicated to the merits of the idea work to diffuse an appreciation of it among a 
larger public. The educational process, furthermore, needs to go well beyond 
conveying information and improving the ability of people to provide informed 
answers about the state of the environment. People are busy; we have lots of things 
on our minds. We are constantly being told that we have to prioritize, engage in 
time management, and take the most important things first. How do you get an 
issue to the top of someone’s priority list? To mobilize people requires a sense of 
urgency. Even better, people ought to see the issue as one of great urgency—the 
sort of problem that, if you do not address it now, it is going to be too late and you 
are going to deeply regret your failure. If it is not important, people will not invest 
enough in doing something about it, let alone invest in action that may well be 
costly to them. 
A big reason the 1970s policy window opened is that people thought 
environmental problems were both important and urgent. The 1960s had been a 
period of awakening to some truths about the planet—especially the truth that the 
planet’s resources are finite and can be used up. Such ecological ideas penetrated 
into the popular consciousness.  
The enthusiasm for the Apollo project to land a person on the moon by the 
end of the 1960s provides an illustration of part of the dynamics useful for 
mobilizing broad citizen support for bold initiatives. The American people were 
enthusiastically behind the Apollo project because they were convinced of the 
urgency of the mission. In 1957, at the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union 
successfully launched Sputnik I.34 Americans became alarmed at the potentially 
adverse consequences of trailing behind the Soviet Union in command of outer 
space, and so the space race between the United States and the Soviet Union began 
with a great sense of urgency. What is more, in a manner unanticipated by the 
project’s boosters, the Apollo effort then played a critical role in stimulating the 
great environmental legislative innovations a decade later. 
The Apollo lunar missions sent a stunning series of photographs back to 
Earth. These photographs were visible objects that mediated between the space race 
and the environmental movement. The first of these photographs, known as 
“Earthrise,” was shot from Apollo 11 in December 1968.35 The most famous 
photograph, though, is called the “Blue Marble.”36 It was shot from the Apollo 17 
mission in 1972, and is reputed to be among the most duplicated and reproduced 
photographs in history, showing an Earth of remarkable beauty that somehow also 
conveys a sense of great fragility.37 These images changed our conception of the 
planet, shifting away from Frederick Jackson Turner’s idea of the importance of an 
 
 34 Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., Sputnik and the Dawn of the Space Age, 
http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2009).  
 35 Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., Image of the Day Gallery, http://www.nasa.gov/multimedia/ 
imagegallery/image_feature_102.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2009). 
 36 Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., Visible Earth: The Blue Marble, http://visibleearth.nasa.gov/ 
view_rec.php?id=2429 (last visited Apr. 19, 2009). 
 37 Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., Visible Earth: The Blue Marble from Apollo 17, 
http://visibleearth.nasa.gov/view_rec.php?id=1597 (last visited Apr. 19, 2009); see, e.g., Nat’l 
Aeronautics and Space Admin., History of the Blue Marble (2009), http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/ 
Features/BlueMarble/BlueMarble_history.php (last visited Apr. 19, 2009). 
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ever expanding frontier38 toward Kenneth Boulding’s picture of a finite world in 
the form of a Spaceship Earth.39 Many historians believe that the worldwide 
modern environmental movement began the moment that Earthrise was sent back 
home.40 It was as if people all over the world looked at the images and uttered a 
collective, “Oh, I get it.” These pictures began a new way of thinking about our 
relationship to one another and to our planet. 
Shortly before the first Earth Day, the New York Times expressed the 
connection between the space missions and the ascending ecological movement.41 
Less than two weeks prior to the first Earth Day, the United States had launched 
Apollo 13.42 This is the mission that Tom Hanks flew, in which an oxygen tank 
exploded two days into the mission, forcing the trio of astronauts to move into the 
lunar module for the rest of the trip around the moon and back to earth.43 After 
Apollo 13 returned safely, the New York Times published an editorial entitled 
Earth Day and Space Day: 
As the disabled Apollo 13 rounded the moon and flew homeward again last week, 
there was passionate worldwide interest in its “consumables.” Was there enough 
oxygen and water left on their crippled craft to permit Lovell, Haise and Swigert to 
make it back to earth? Would the available supply of lithium hydroxide suffice to 
clean their air of carbon dioxide and keep it breathable until splashdown? . . . It is only 
recently . . . that many people have begun to realize that earth too is a sort of spaceship 
and that it too has only a limited supply of consumables. . . . Every person understood 
last week that the scarce supplies on Apollo 13 had to be husbanded carefully, 
consumed economically, and recycled for reuse wherever possible. Earth Day next 
Wednesday aims above all to convince the American people that similar prudence is 
required on Spaceship Earth.44  
The ability of a broad social movement to come together and stay together 
long enough to move policy significantly in its direction is often thwarted by 
inertia. Ordinarily, an awareness of the fragility of the natural environment might 
not by itself have supplied the momentum needed to overcome this inertia. 
However, in the policy window that opened in the early 1970s, this general change 
in consciousness about our planet became linked with a much more immediate and 
pressing issue—individual health. The media covered a regular stream of stories 
 
 38 Turner advanced his “frontier thesis” in a lecture titled, The Significance of the Frontier in 
American History, delivered at a meeting of the American Historical Association held in conjunction 
with the Chicago Expedition in 1893. Frederick Jackson Turner, Address at the Meeting of the 
American Historical Association (July 12, 1893), in THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1921), 
http://xroads.virginia.edu/~Hyper/TURNER/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2009).  
 39 Kenneth E. Boulding, The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY IN A GROWING ECONOMY 3–14 (Henry Jarrett ed., 1966). 
 40 See, e.g., ROBERT POOLE, EARTHRISE: HOW MAN FIRST SAW THE EARTH 13 (2008). 
 41 Earth Day and Space Day, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1970, at § 4, at 16. 
 42 Gaylord Nelson, Earth Day ‘70: What It Meant, EPA J., Apr. 1980, http://www.epa.gov/ 
history/topics/earthday/02.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2009). 
 43 Hanks starred in the 1995 movie recreation of the Apollo 13 mission. The actual mission was piloted 
by James A. Lovell, accompanied by John L. Swigert and Fred W. Haise. See Kennedy Space Center 
Science, Technology and Engineering, NASA Apollo Mission Apollo-13, http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/ 
history/apollo/apollo-13/apollo-13.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2009). 
 44 Earth Day and Space Day, supra note 41. 
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linking limits on the assimilative capacity of the earth’s resources to adverse effects 
on people’s health.45 Revelations about pesticides and other petrochemicals, about 
numerous air pollutants, about waterborne diseases, and about toxic chemicals 
woven into the fabrics of children’s clothing came just at a time when people’s 
expectations about their health and well being were themselves changing.46  
During the same period of time the term “wellness” began to seep into our 
common vocabulary. The environmental historian Samuel Hays has documented a 
progression of thinking about individual health, moving from a simple fatalism 
about disease, to increasing expectations about and demands on the ability of 
modern medicine to cure illness, to the thought that it ought actually to be possible 
to aspire to wellness, largely avoiding illness entirely.47 Management of our own 
life styles was critical to wellness, but so was eliminating the ways in which the 
stresses we ourselves were introducing into the environment contributed to adverse 
health effects, disease, and death.48 As Hays notes, “[i]t was not just that the 
environment had become less healthy as time went on but that ideas about what 
constituted a healthy life had changed.”49 Study after study linked chemicals and 
other environmental stressors to cancer, which only generated ever greater demands 
that these exposures be prevented.50 On the same day that it published its “Earth 
Day and Space Day” editorial, the New York Times published a cartoon depicting 
a mother reading to her child a bedtime story that began: 
Once upon a time there lived a little green elf in an old oak tree which had been 
condemned to make way for Interstate 95. The old oak tree stood by contaminated 
waters that ran along the edge of the strip mine just twenty-five miles from the heavily 
polluted air of the city. In spite of his emphysema he was a fairly happy elf . . . .51  
The revelations of environmental stress frequently had a dramatic, headline 
grabbing quality and served to keep people’s attention. In early 1969, the Santa 
Barbara channel experienced a major oil spill when an offshore rig lost control of 
its well, which continued expelling crude oil for eleven days.52 The spill and the 
damage it caused to beaches and wildlife made the top of the nightly news for 
days.53 Later the same year, Cleveland’s Cuyahoga River caught fire.54 The fire 
only lasted thirty minutes and it was not the first time the Cuyahoga had burned, 
 
 45 See Samuel P. Hays, Three Decades of Environmental Politics, in GOVERNMENT AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 19, 34–37 (M.J. Lacey ed., 1989) (noting that “major chemical threat 
episodes” increased society’s concern for public health). 
 46 See SAMUEL P. HAYS, A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS SINCE 1945, at 29–32 (2000) 
(discussing generally the role of health concerns in the environmental movement). 
 47 Hays, supra note 45, at 34. 
 48 Id. at 35.  
 49 HAYS, supra note 46, at 29. 
 50 Id. at 29–32. 
 51 Edward Abbey, How to Live on This Planet Called Earth, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1970, at 2 
(cartoon embedded in story). 
 52 FRANK T. MANHEIM, THE CONFLICT OVER ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: ORIGINS, OUTCOMES, AND COMPARISONS WITH THE EU AND OTHER REGIONS 42 (2009). 
 53 Id.  
 54 Ohio History Central, Cuyahoga River Fire, http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/entry.php? 
rec=1642 (last visted Apr. 19, 2009). 
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but this time it captured the imagination of the country and made Cleveland the butt 
of dirty river jokes for years to come.55 Randy Newman memorialized the event in 
a popular song56 and Time Magazine painted the grim picture: 
Some river! Chocolate-brown, oily, bubbling with sub-surface gases, it oozes rather 
than flows. “Anyone who falls into the Cuyahoga does not drown,” Cleveland’s 
citizens joke grimly. “He decays.” The Federal Water Pollution Control 
Administration dryly notes: “The lower Cuyahoga has no visible life, not even low 
forms such as leeches and sludge worms that usually thrive on wastes.” It is also—
literally—a fire hazard.57 
These stories are just a few examples of how the media contributed to the 
heightened awareness and anxiety over the environment. During the mid-sixties, the 
environment had become the new darling topic of the mainstream media, which 
eagerly covered breaking news of environmental problems, running with both the 
Spaceship Earth and the human health dimensions of these problems.58 One by one, 
products from major industries were placed under the environmental microscope and 
examined by the media.59 Take pesticides. Pesticides have long been called 
“economic poisons.” They are economically valuable to the agricultural economy 
because they control pests, and that function requires them to be poisonous.60 
However, they are often poisonous to a broader spectrum of flora and fauna, 
including human beings, than the pests they are purchased to control. Prior to the 
1960s, most news stories covered pesticides from the perspective of the benefits that 
they bring to agriculture—the news stories focused on the “economic” aspect of these 
“economic poisons.”61 As of 1955, for example, approximately 90% of the coverage 
of pesticides had a financial and economic focus.62 But then in the early sixties—
along the time of Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring63—the coverage shifted to the 
“poison” aspect.64 By 1960, about 45% of the stories focused on economics and 
finance, while 55% concerned the health and environmental effects of pesticides.65 
 
 55 See Cuyahoga River Cleaner, but Not Yet Pristine, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 2, 2009, 
http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/local_news/stories/2009/03/02/cuyahoga_river.html?sid=101 (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2009) (noting the Cuyahoga was the butt of jokes by Johnny Carson and others).  
 56 RANDY NEWMAN, Burn On, on SAIL AWAY (Reprise Records 1972). 
 57 The Cities: The Price of Optimism, TIME, Aug. 1, 1969, at 41.  
 58 See, e.g., Editorial, To Save Spaceship Earth, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1968, at E10 (stressing the 
importance of the International Biological Program to help understand human impacts on Spaceship 
Earth); Phillip L. Rusden, Pure Air for Trees, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1965, at X17 (advocating preservation 
of pure air in part due to the effects air pollution has on human health).  
 59 See, e.g., Joseph C. Ingraham, Showdown Near On Auto Fumes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug, 9, 1964, at 
L47 (describing a “showdown” in California over how quickly automobile manufacturers could 
eliminate exhaust fumes from their cars).  
 60 See, e.g., Cornell University Cooperative Extension, Pesticide Safety Education Program 
Pesticide Dictionary (1998), http://psep.cce.cornell.edu/Tutorials/dictionary.aspx (last visited Apr.  19, 
2009) (defining “pesticide” as “[a]n economic poison defined in most state and federal laws as any 
substance used for controlling, preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest”). 
 61 BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 30, at 113 fig.6.1. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).  
 64 BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 30, at 113 fig.6.1. 
 65 Id. 
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Once the news coverage shifted focus, its valence also shifted. Economic or financial 
stories were favorable to the pesticide industry 82% of the time, while health or 
environmental stories were negative in tone nearly 80% of the time.66  
In the immediate run up to April 22, 1970, newspapers around the country had 
a news hook on which they hung numerous stories about environmental problems, 
with local newspapers finding local angles on which to focus.67 The national papers 
provided in depth coverage of such things as the “new science” of ecology, the 
pervasiveness of pollution problems in air, water and land, and the finite resources 
of the planet.68 Newspaper coverage of ecological and public health issues was 
enormous. Two days prior to the first Earth Day, the New York Times ran a 
multipage spread providing a comprehensive overview of environmental 
problems—you could teach an entire environmental law course based simply on the 
issues and information packed into this coverage.69 
The first Earth Day, April 22, 1970, had been orchestrated to take advantage 
of the nation’s increasing concerns over ecological and environmental stresses, 
while at the same time serving as an exclamation point for it. An estimated 20 
million Americans took part in some activity—marches, teach-ins, giving up the 
use of their car for the day—all across America.70 A photograph of 5th Avenue 
from 42nd Street, with Central Park in the distance and packed with people, made 
the front page of the New York Times.71 It illustrated the outpouring of 
participation throughout the country on that day.72 On the first Earth Day, about 
one in every ten Americans actively participated in some Earth Day event, whether 
it was a teach-in, the symbolic burying of an internal combustion engine, walking 
instead of driving to work, marching down a main street in their town, or standing 
and listening to speakers.73 These are the kinds of personal investments that 
indicate a commitment to an issue beyond paying lip service. Critically, they were 
also the kinds of personal investments that suggested to those involved in electoral 
politics that the environment had become an issue that might move some voters to 
vote for or against candidates on the basis of their stand on environmental issues.  
Some of the pieces we have been developing can now be put together: One 
key factor contributing to the policy window opening up in the early 1970s was that 
people’s awareness of the planet and their relationship to it was changing in ways 
 
 66 Id. at 112 tbl.6.1. 
 67 Environmental Paupers: Pollution Trend Denounced, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 27, 1970, at 4B. 
 68 Roger Revelle, Human Ecology and Ethics Are Inseparable, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1970, at 88.  
 69 Gladwin Hill, Man and His Environment: Some Basic Facts About a Growing National Problem, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1970, at 33. 
 70 Joseph Lelyveld, Millions Join In Earth Day Observances Across the Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
23, 1970, at 1. For more on the atmosphere surrounding Earth Day, see LAZARUS, supra note 24, at 54, 
and GRAHAM, supra note 24, at 1–2. 
 71 Patrick A. Burns, Millions Join Earth Day Observances Across the Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 
1970, at 1. 
 72 Id.; Gladwin Hill, Activity Ranges from Oratory to Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1970, at 1. 
 73 See Finis Dunaway, Gas Masks, Pogo, and the Ecological Indian: Earth Day and the Visual 
Politics of American Environmentalism, 60 AM. Q. 67, 67, 81 (2008); Hill, supra note 72; Gladwin Hill, 
Nation Set to Observe Earth Day, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1970, at 36; Douglas Robinson, City Bans Cars 
in 4 Parks Tomorrow, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1970, at 36; U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF 
POPULATION 1-41 tbl.1 (1972) (noting that the United States’s population in 1970 was 203,211,926, of 
which 20 million people equates to about 1 in every 10 Americans.) 
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that wedded long-term concerns about Spaceship Earth to their immediate self-
interest in the health of themselves and their children. Attention and focus on these 
problems were tremendously aided by the press and media, which confirmed the 
people’s worst fears by continually reporting vivid and dramatic events being 
processed by this emerging public consciousness.  
Elected officials in Washington, D.C. were also becoming aware of this shift 
in attitude. On Earth Day, while a large crowd gathered around the Washington 
monument to hear speeches and enjoy a rock concert, many of Washington’s 
politicians had deserted the city, fanning out across the country to their districts and 
states to participate and be seen in Earth Day events there.74 Indeed, Washington 
had already begun responding to the growing environmental consciousness prior to 
Earth Day, but after Earth Day the pace of legislation accelerated.75 Elected 
officials began competing among themselves to offer legislation or public policy 
ideas that would be most appealing to the growing segment of the population that 
was indicating the importance of environmental concerns in their electoral decision 
making.76 The problem solving solutions of the time were very much influenced by 
a broad belief in the power of American technology to conquer any obstacle. Just as 
the growing ecological consciousness owes much to the Apollo space program, so 
the passage of innovative legislation owes a great deal to the undeniable spirit of 
technological optimism that dominated the public psyche. A decade earlier, when 
President Kennedy had announced his plan to place a man on the moon by the end 
of the 1960s, he had begun by telling the American people the country had the 
ability to meet the challenge and win the space race, if only we committed 
ourselves to the project: 
I believe we possess all the resources and talents necessary. But the facts of the matter 
are that we have never made the national decisions or marshaled the national resources 
required for such leadership. We have never specified long-range goals on an urgent time 
schedule, or managed our resources and our time so as to insure their fulfillment.77  
President Kennedy had effectively committed the nation to landing a man on 
the moon by the end of the decade. On July 20, 1969, Neil Armstrong fulfilled that 
commitment by stepping off the lunar module onto the moon’s surface.78 That step, 
furthermore, marked the successful achievement of a commitment that had been 
driven by a government initiative heavily reliant on science and technology. In an 
irrefutable way, Armstrong’s landing came to symbolize enormous optimism in the 
combination of technology and commitment. Ever since, it has become rather 
 
 74 Richard Harwood, Earth Day Stirs Nation, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1970, at A1. 
 75 See GRAHAM, supra note 24, at 3. 
 76 E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millan, Toward a Theory of Statutory 
Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 327–28 (1985). 
 77 President John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs (May 25, 
1961), available at www.nasa.gov/pdf/59595main_jfk.speech.pdf. 
 78 Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., Apollo 40th Anniversary, http://www.nasa.gov/ 
mission_pages/apollo/index.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2009).  
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common for an advocate of some bold national policy to proclaim, “If we can put a 
man on the moon, surely we can do this as well.”79 
The environmental initiatives of the 1970s took major advantage of this wave 
of technological optimism. At the same time as the country was coming to believe 
that we faced serious and urgent environmental problems, it also was convinced 
that as a nation we possessed the knowledge, resources, and innovative capacities 
to solve those problems, if only we would make “the national decisions [and] 
marshal[] the national resources required.”80 Just as in the case of the lunar landing, 
all that was holding us back from solving our environmental problems was that 
“[w]e have never specified long-range goals on an urgent time schedule, or 
managed our resources and our time so as to insure their fulfillment.”81 
On the national scene, technological optimism largely overshadowed other 
philosophical or intellectual constituents of the broader environmental movement. 
Some people argued for major changes in individual lifestyles, to move us from a 
consumption-oriented economy to one that stresses quality of life values, while 
minimizing the exhaustible resources moving through the economy, sometimes 
described as a philosophy of doing more with less.82 Others advocated a steady 
state or no growth economy.83 While these ideas have been and remain influential 
within environmentalism, they have never caught on within the broader public as 
conceptions of how we could conquer our environmental problems. Instead, 
technological optimism permitted policy makers and the public to defer the 
necessity of confronting the ecological limits to growth. This was typified in a 
press conference held by Senator Ed Muskie (D-ME), one of the leading architects 
of the environmental policy innovation that was moving through Washington.84 
Responding to reports that “[a] growing number of conservationists have been 
urging a halt to economic growth to prevent the wasting of our natural resources 
and the polluting of our air, water and land,” Muskie was quick to disagree, 
countering “that a growing modern technology would be needed to provide a better 
quality of life for all human beings.”85 
If the earlier influences we have noted—the growing attention of an aroused 
public, demanding responses to an increasing array of environmental problems—
created the demand for congressional action, then technological optimism played a 
significant role in creating the supply of legislative proposals to meet that demand. 
It is possible that by themselves these ingredients would have been sufficient to 
 
 79 See, e.g., Rand Simberg, The Last Scientist On The Moon, FOX NEWS, Dec. 12, 2002, 
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,72846,00.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2009) 
(“There were many variations on a saying after the Apollo landings. ‘If we can put a man on the moon, 
why can’t we (fill in the blank)?’) 
 80 Id. (“If we, as a nation, wanted to return to the moon today, the conventional wisdom is that it 
would probably take us longer than it did the first time[,]” which leads one to ask, “‘If we can put a man 
on the moon, why can’t we put a man on the moon?’”) 
 81 Kennedy, supra note 77. 
 82 See, e.g., ROBERT C. PAEHLKE, ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE FUTURE OF PROGRESSIVE 
POLITICS 137–39 (1989) (describing the Conserver Society, with its motto of doing more with less). 
 83 See id. at 124 (describing the concept of a steady-state economy). 
 84 See David Bird, Muskie Tells Conservationists Economic Growth Must Go On, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
19, 1970, at 84. 
 85 Id. 
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conquer the opposition put up by the concentrated economic interests who would 
have to bear the costs of the new pollution control requirements, restrictions on 
construction of new plants, controls to protect drinking water, endangered species, 
and wetlands that the new environmental measures brought with them. As it 
happened, though, the 1970s policy agenda also benefited appreciably from the fact 
that as the window was opening up, the strength of that opposition was at quite a 
low point within the American polity.  
David Vogel has argued that at this particular time business and industry were 
ill equipped and ill prepared to marshal their vast potential resources to combat the 
emerging environmental movement.86 Several factors contributed to industry’s 
weakened state. For one, mistrust of industry was running at high tide, making 
business leaders reluctant to oppose popular legislation as aggressively as they had 
as recently as 1967, when the relatively weak Air Quality Act of 1967 showed the 
influence of successful lobbying by the coal coalition.87 The public’s animosity 
toward the automobile industry was particularly strong both because the 
surveillance by Ralph Nader of the country’s largest automaker, General Motors, 
had just been exposed88 and because the automobile was closely identified with the 
smog problems of the nation’s cities. For another, the very breadth of the agenda 
covered by the 1970 Act divided industry’s interests. For example, stationary 
sources and auto makers were primarily concerned with different parts of the clean 
air bill.89 No umbrella organization existed to present a united package of shared 
business concerns. In fact, remedying this shortcoming in business’ ability to 
advocate for its interests constituted a significant reason leading to the founding of 
the Business Roundtable in 1973.90 
In the case of the Clean Air Act in particular, industry was also taken by surprise 
by some of the contents of the final legislation, which developed late in the drafting 
process and which diverged markedly from earlier drafts.91 The bill that eventually 
passed by the Senate—the version that set the tone for much of the Conference 
Committee’s work—emerged in August 1970 in a much different form from earlier 
 
 86 See David Vogel, A Case Study of Clean Air Legislation 1967–1981, in THE IMPACT OF THE 
MODERN CORPORATION 309, 322–23 (Betty Bock et al. eds., 1984) (describing the 1970 Clear Air Act 
Amendments as “a major political defeat” for various industries).  
 87 See id. at 323 (discussing the “gradual and steady increase in public suspicion of big business” 
during the late 1960s); id. at 319–20 (discussing the coal industry’s lobbying efforts); see also Robert L. 
Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1293 (1986). While the 
public interest regulations passed in the 1970s by nature were not particularly friendly to business,  
big business was truly on the defensive as the public seemed responsive to a wide variety of 
concerns about the quality of life. An entire series of initiatives resulted—on auto safety, product 
design, air and water pollution control, scenic conservation, and occupational health and safety, 
to mention only the most significant—which manifested a distinct bias against economic growth. 
The political climate made it virtually impossible to oppose such programs in principle—and 
focused objections can always be pursued in the process of agency implementation. 
Id. 
 88 See Vogel, supra note 86, at 326.  
 89 Id. at 328. 
 90 E.g., id. at 335 (during the drafting of the 1977 Amendments, as opposed to the 1970 
Amendments, “the Business Roundtable was available at least to attempt to formulate a series of 
political positions that reflected the common interests of many larger companies.”). 
 91 Id. at 337. 
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drafts.92 Industry was simply inadequately prepared and had insufficient time to 
mount an effective counterattack on the most onerous provisions, although they tried, 
both by lobbying Congress directly and by working with the Nixon Administration, 
which unsuccessfully opposed some of the stronger measures.93  
Yet another reason the early environmental movement had been able to steal a 
march on business in the 1970 legislation was that up to this point the real action in 
setting emissions standards under federal law had taken place in the Executive 
Branch. In 1970, a Republican president was in charge and business had 
established excellent relations and considerable influence with the president.94 
Thinking this pattern would not change, business and industry surmised that there 
would be ample opportunity to press for relatively moderate regulatory responses to 
the perceived crisis of air quality.95 They did not, therefore, go on full alert during 
the legislative drafting process, and this contributed to their being caught ill-
prepared when the Senate version of the Clean Air Act appeared in the late 
summer, which sharply curtailed Executive agency discretion over some critical 
elements in the law. 
By the end of the drafting process, business and industry did mobilize and 
achieve some modest concessions, including an additional year within which the 
automakers could apply for an extension of the tailpipe emissions mandate, and a 
lowering of requirements for how durable automobile emissions control equipment 
had to be in relation to the life of the automobile.96 Overall, however, the industry 
effort was too little, too late, and too poorly coordinated to regain much of the 
ground they had lost in the Senate version of the bill. On December 17, 1970, the 
Conference Committee reported a bill that adopted the Senate version on 
practically all of the hotly contested points and the Conference Bill sailed through 
both the Senate and the House.97 
This comparative weakness of industry coalitions in the halls of Congress that 
contributed to the opening of the policy window of the early 1970s did not last long. 
As intimated earlier by the brief mention of the creation of the Business Roundtable, 
business interests did not stay disorganized. When the stakes involved in federal 
legislation became known, business interests organized rapidly.98 Individual firms 
and trade associations committed more staff and resources to lobbying.99 Some, such 
as the National Automobile Dealers Association and the International Council of 
Shopping Centers, were well-established and effective organizations that had stayed 
on the sidelines in 1970 but mobilized vigorously for the 1977 legislation.100 Whole 
 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 332–35 (“[Muskie’s] subcommittee report came as a total surprise to the industries affected 
by it.”). 
 94 Id. at 328–29. 
 95 Id. at 329–30. 
 96 Id. at 333. 
 97 See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1146, at 42–59 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356, 5374–91.  
 98 See, e.g., Business Roundtable, History, http://www.businessroundtable.org/about/history (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2009) (describing the formation of the Business Rountable). 
 99 See, e.g., id.  
 100 Vogel, supra note 86, at 346, 352. 
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new organizations, in particular the Business Roundtable101 and the “Washington 
Coordinating Committee,”102 had come into existence principally in order to advocate 
for positions shared by corporate America. By the mid-1970s, these organizing 
efforts were beginning to bear fruit.103 
All of these organizing efforts were consistent with a remarkable 
memorandum authored by the late Justice Lewis Powell while he was still in 
private practice and one of the leading corporate lawyers in the country.104 In 1971, 
Powell wrote to Eugene Sydnor, Director of the United States Chamber of 
Commerce.105 The date was August 23, 1971, just two months before President 
Nixon nominated Mr. Powell to the Supreme Court.106 Powell wrote to warn of a 
threat to business broader than that posed by environmentalism itself, amounting to 
nothing less than a “broad attack” on the entire American economic system and 
form of government.107 After a diagnosis of the threat, the memorandum shifted to 
a sharp criticism of the boards of directors and chief executives of “corporations 
great and small and business organizations at all levels” for responding “if at all—
by appeasement, ineptitude and ignoring the problem.”108 The memorandum urged 
that business organize itself, both in individual firms and in larger associations, “to 
 
 101 The Business Roundtable was founded in 1972. Its website provides this description of its 
objectives: 
[The original founders started the Business Roundtable in the belief that] the business sector 
should play an active and effective role in the formation of public policy. . . . [They wanted] an 
organization in which CEOs of leading enterprises could get together, study issues, try to 
develop a consensus, formulate positions and advocate those views. Business Roundtable was 
formed with two major goals: 1. To enable chief executives from different corporations to work 
together to analyze specific issues affecting the economy and business; and 2. To present 
government and the public with knowledgeable, timely information, and with practical, positive 
proposals for action. 
Business Roundtable, History, http://www.businessroundtable.org/about/history (last visited Apr. 18, 2009). 
 102 The Washington Coordinating Committee was formed explicitly to influence the 1977 round of 
Clean Air Act legislation. Its members included individual firms as well as the Chamber of Commerce, 
the National Association of Manufacturers, and the Business Roundtable. Its major priority was resisting 
the incorporation of a Prevention of Significant Deterioration program into the statute. Vogel, supra note 
86, at 357. 
 103 See, e.g., id. at 339 (“[The 1977 clean air legislation was the] most aggressively lobbied and 
probably among the most complex pieces of legislation approved by Congress in at least a quarter of a 
century . . . . By the mid-1970s, the enormous stakes involved in federal regulation of air pollution had 
become much more apparent than they were at the beginning of the decade . . . . For the companies 
regulated under the provisions of 1970 legislation, the 1977 amendments represented their first 
important opportunity to modify those particular aspects of the 1970 law, and its interpretation by EPA 
and the courts, that they regarded as unreasonable.”). 
 104 My thanks to Michael Blumm for reminding me of the relevance of the Powell memorandum. 
 105 Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman, Educ. Comm., U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23, 1971), in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND 
SOCIETY SUPPLEMENT 1 (3d ed. 2004), available at http://www.aspenlawschool.com/books/ 
plater_environmentallaw/updates/02.5.pdf [hereinafter Powell Memorandum]; ReclaimDemocracy.org, 
The Powell Memo, http://www.reclaimdemocracy.org/corporate_accountability/powell_memo_ 
lewis.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2009) (providing background on the Powell memorandum). 
 106 Powell Memorandum, supra note 105, at intro. 
 107 See id. at 1. 
 108 Id. at 3. 
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counter—on the broadest front—the attack on the enterprise system.”109 It 
suggested an array of strategies and tactics for the counterattack; here, we can 
concentrate on its recommendations for the political arena. Lamenting that “few 
elements of American society today have as little influence in government as the 
American businessman,” Powell urged both “educational programs . . . designed to 
enlighten public thinking,” and also “direct political action . . . [to] assiduously 
cultivate[]” political power.110 Whether or not directly influenced by Powell’s 
memorandum, the business community soon took its lessons to heart. 
Economic interests learned organizational and political lessons from their 
experiences in the 1970s upon which they have been building ever since. Therefore, 
the special conditions that existed during the policy window of the early 1970s in 
which business influence in policy debates was particularly weak may not be 
repeated any time soon. That does not necessarily mean, however, that policy that 
benefits the broad public interest cannot be enacted. Sometimes such legislation 
furthers the interests of some industry members sufficiently to reduce opposition, 
and even to generate support, for such measures. And sometimes a social 
movement can arise with sufficient momentum to drive policy, even in the face of 
concentrated opposition. As suggested earlier, the early seventies just might have 
been a period in which substantial environmental progress would have been made 
even if business had been well organized to resist. 
In addition to a relatively weak opposition, our historical survey of the 1970s 
has emphasized considerations on both the supply and the demand sides as 
important to policy innovation. On the supply side, the organizing concept of 
technological optimism made responding to demands for policy innovation seem 
feasible. On the demand side, a mobilized public pressed home the electoral 
importance of government actually responding. The public mobilized because of a 
sense of urgency sustained by its ability to see the connection between policy 
innovation and values of great concern to them. How does the present compare to 
the 1970s with respect to these two sets of considerations? Any evaluation of the 
contemporary situation in either of these dimensions runs a great risk of soon 
becoming obsolete, because both the available rationales for policy innovation and 
the public’s commitment to strong action are moving targets. Therefore, having by 
this last sentence warned future readers that everything that follows is subject to 
being changed by future events, this Essay concludes with a few observations by 
way of comparing now to then along these two dimensions. 
During his winning presidential campaign, Barack Obama deployed the 
language of technological optimism numerous times, even to the extent of invoking 
the “If we can put a man on the Moon . . .” refrain that was popular in the wake of 
the Apollo success.111 When his opponent, John McCain, called for a $300 million 
prize for the scientist who builds a long-lasting car battery, candidate Obama 
brought JFK himself into the argument, replying that “[w]hen John F. Kennedy 
decided that we were going to put a man on the Moon, he didn’t put a bounty out 
for some rocket scientist to win . . . . He put the full resources of the United States 
 
 109 Id. at 4. 
 110 Id. at 9–10. 
 111 E.g., Christopher H. Schroeder, Third Way Environmentalism, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 801, 823 (2000). 
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government behind the project.”112 President Obama’s new Secretary of the 
Interior, Ken Salazar, continued the allusions to President Kennedy’s success by 
telling the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee during his 
confirmation hearings that, “I would not have taken this job if I was not given the 
assignment to help craft the energy moon shot that we will take . . . .”113 Thus, 
invocations of the Apollo mission remain part of the current environmental 
discourse. What is less clear is whether people share the conviction that such 
optimism is warranted, or whether the “if we can put a man on the Moon . . .” 
rhetoric has become a cliché. 
With respect to the demand for policy innovation, the current situation is 
similarly ambiguous. In recent years, news coverage of climate change continues to 
grow, and increasingly it seems to have moved beyond treating global temperature 
rise as something that may or may not happen and toward treating it as a reliable 
overall prediction, with uncertainty only surrounding the magnitude and rapidity of 
increase as well as some of the regional consequences. The latest report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the strongest consensus 
statement yet on the seriousness and certainty of the problem,114 received extensive 
press coverage, as did the unusual awarding of the Nobel Peace prize jointly to Al 
Gore and the IPCC.115 Hurricanes Katrina, Gustav, and Ike have prompted media 
coverage explaining the connection between global warming and the increased 
severity of such weather events.116  
Despite the media frenzy, the climate change issue has not yet generated an 
aroused intensity equal to that of the 1970s. One significant problem is that while 
climate change may seem ominous in its implications, it still does not seem 
imminent. Its implications remain highly uncertain and not yet of enough perceived 
severity for enough individuals. People who live in low-lying areas prone to 
hurricanes might have seen a glimpse of the future in Katrina, but people have been 
experiencing hurricanes, suffering loss of life and property, and then rebuilding in 
the same places for centuries. Many people still seem to maintain the same sense of 
fatalism about natural disasters as they used to about the prospects of becoming ill. 
And for others outside of the hurricane alleys, the harms to worry about from 
climate change seem either manageable or still too far down the road to squeeze out 
 
 112 Senator Barack Obama, Campaign Speech in Las Vegas, Nevada (June 24, 2008), quoted in Brent 
Budowksy, Moon Shot, Obama, CONSORTIUM NEWS, June 25, 2008, http://www.consortiumnews.com/ 
2008/062508a.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2009).  
 113 Salazar Nomination: Hearing Before the S. Com. on Energy and Natural Resources to Consider the 
Nomination of Ken Salazar to be Secretary of the Interior, 111th Cong. 26 (2009) (statement of Senator 
Ken Salazar), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_ 
senate_hearings&docid=f:47254.pdf. 
 114 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS 
REPORT (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf [hereinafter 
IPCC REPORT].  
 115 See, e.g., U.N. Report: Global Warming Man-Made, Basically Unstoppable, FOX NEWS, Feb. 2, 
2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,249659,00.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2009) (covering the 
IPCC Report); Walter Gibbs & Sarah Lyall, Gore Shares Peace Prize for Climate Change Work, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/13/world/13nobel.html (last visited Apr. 19, 
2009) (covering the joint Nobel Prize award). 
 116 See, e.g., Bryan Walsh, Is Global Warming Worsening Hurricanes?, TIME, Sept. 8, 2008, 
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1839281,00.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2009). 
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more immediate problems calling for our attention, or both. What is more, not 
every part of the globe is going to suffer from climate change. Some parts of the 
world will benefit,117 and while many projections have overall costs exceeding 
benefits for most global warming scenarios,118 in all cases the impacts are not 
uniform across the board.119 So, wishful thinking can convince people that they 
have better things to worry about. Overall, even for those who accept the reality of 
climate change, it registers with them first and foremost as a failure of 
stewardship—a manifestation of humankind’s hubris in behaving irresponsibly 
toward the planet—but lacks the accompanying threat to immediate self-interest 
that helped boost public arousal during the 1970s policy window.  
Even though the science of climate change has become more and more secure 
in the past twenty years, the nature of the public’s reaction to the problem has not 
noticeably changed. For example, the number of people who worry a great deal 
about climate change has had its ups and downs over the past twenty years, but 
overall it simply has not changed much since 1990.120 In 1990, Gallup registered 
30% of respondents “personally worrying a great deal about ‘the greenhouse effect’ 
or global warming”; in January of 2008 that figure was 37%; and between these 
two dates the number has fluctuated between 24% and 41%.121 More people today 
think that global warming poses a serious threat to their way of life in their lifetime 
than thought so ten years ago, but six in ten still think global warming does NOT 
pose a serious threat.122  
One significant disadvantage facing climate change policy innovation 
compared to the environmental policy innovation of the 1970s relates to the time 
frame within which mitigating measures can have any discernible impact. Climate 
change is a function of greenhouse gas levels, and actually lowering those levels 
will begin only decades after we begin serious efforts to lower greenhouse gas 
emissions.123 Unlike the environmental problems faced earlier, therefore, Congress 
cannot credibly promise quick fixes to solve the problems (the quick fixes 
promised earlier, of course, failed in their grander ambitions, but progress on them 
did return tangible results in the short term). On the campaign trail, then-Senator 
Obama endorsed a goal of an 80% reduction in greenhouse gases by the year 2050, 
and that is the time frame of many draft climate change bills in Congress today.124 
2050 is a long way away, and it is harder to energize people around such a distant 
goal. President Kennedy was himself pressing the edge of the envelope when he 
 
 117 See, e.g., IPCC REPORT, supra note 114, at 48 (“Climate change is projected to bring some 
benefits in temperate areas, such as fewer deaths from cold exposure . . . .”). 
 118 See, e.g., id. (“Overall it is expected that benefits will be outweighed by the negative health 
effects of rising temperatures, especially in developing countries.”). 
 119 See id. at 32 fig.1.2 (presenting map of “[c]hanges in physical and biological systems and surface 
temperature 1970–2004”). 
 120 Gallup, Little Increase in Americans’ Global Warming Worries, http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 
106660/Little-Increase-Americans-Global-Warming-Worries.aspx (last visited Apr. 19, 2009) 
[hereinafter Gallup Poll].  
 121 Id. at tbl. 
 122 Id. 
 123 See generally IPCC REPORT, supra note 114, at 58, 66. 
 124 See Ben Lieberman & William W. Beach, Global Climate-Change Bills Before Congress, 
HERITAGE FOUND., Oct. 11, 2007, at tbl.1, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/ 
EnergyandEnvironment/upload/bg2075_table.pdf.  
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challenged the nation to put a person on the moon in less than a decade.125 The 
most talked about major greenhouse gas goal post is four times farther out than 
that—and that is only an interim goal, not sufficient to stabilize greenhouse gas 
concentrations at an acceptable level.126 The physical nature of the global warming 
phenomenon suggests that even though the problem may seem real to people and 
its implications may even seem daunting, it remains remote, lacking a sufficient 
sense of personal hazard and urgency that may be necessary to mobilize the kind of 
support required to take the required costly action. Again, the polling data reflect 
this perspective.127 The number of people who think immediate and drastic action is 
required has stayed at around 35% for more than a decade.128  
In one respect, it may well be an acceptable thing that people do not think 
drastic action is required, if people remain willing to go along with legislative 
initiatives that institute manageable moderate action, and thereby stand behind 
legislation that at least begins to reduce annual greenhouse gas emissions as a 
preliminary step. There is something to that idea, but once specific climate change 
measures begin to move in the Congress, the opponents of those climate change 
measures surely will characterize the proposed actions as both drastic and costly in 
order to defeat them. If those labels stick, public opinion may well side with the 
opposition. This is in stark contrast to the mood of the country during the earlier 
innovative policy window, when the country seemed ready for such drastic action. Of 
course, the public then may have thought that the drastic action would place burdens 
on others, specifically the industries that were considered the culprits in the story, 
whom they also thought had been withholding technological innovations from the 
American people that were well within the capacity of industry to produce. Now, 
when people think about the actions required, they understand that it will involve 
higher gas prices, more limited automobile selections, and other life-style changes 
that will adversely affect them—all to fix a problem that they are yet experiencing as 
posing a personal hazard to them. Reflecting this attitude, another recent poll, 
conducted by the Public Opinion and Policy Center of the National Center for Public 
Policy Research, found that 65% of Americans reject spending even a penny more for 
gasoline in an effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.129  
Turning now to the opposition, it is clearly much better organized and mobilized 
than it was in 1970. The pushback against signing the Kyoto Protocol back in 1998 
included a significant and effective ad campaign paid for largely by the energy 
 
 125 Kennedy, supra note 77, at 4. 
 126 See Mark Hertsgaard, A Global Green Deal, NATION, Feb. 25, 2009, http://www.thenation.com/ 
doc/20090316/hertsgaard?rel=hp_picks (last visited Apr. 19, 2009) (referring to a speech made by 
Rajendra Pachauri, chairman of the IPCC, in which Pachauri explains that Obama’s goal of 80% by 
2050 falls short of the response needed by world leaders and urges Obama to embrace the European 
Union’s goal of reducing emissions to 20% below 1990 levels by 2020). 
 127 See Gallup Poll, supra note 120 (reporting 61% of Americans believe the effects of global 
warming have already begun and more than 33% worry about significant effects ranging from species 
extinction to loss of tropical rainforest to pollution of drinking water, but over half think global warming 
will not pose a serious threat during their lifetime). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Press Release, National Center for Public Policy Research, Overwhelming Majority of Americans 
Oppose Lieberman-Warner Global Warming Proposal, New Poll Suggests (May 28, 2008), 
http://www.nationalcenter.org/PR-Poll_Lieberman_Warner_052808.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2009). 
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companies,130 and those industries that stand to be negatively affected in the 
marketplace have remained organized and on the alert ever since. Such opposition 
has now been built deeply into our political system. Throughout the 1970s, 
environmental bills were a largely bipartisan effort, with environmental bills passing 
the Senate by an average vote of 76 to 5 and the House by an average of 331 to 30.131 
Today, there is a sharp partisan divide on environmental policies generally, but also 
on climate change specifically. For example, a Pew Research Center poll shows that 
something around one-half of Republicans think that global warming is occurring, 
compared to an overall national number closer to 70%.132 Among Republicans those 
with more education are even more skeptical toward global warming than those with 
less.133 Another Pew Research Center study that provides more differentiated figures 
identifies the greatest divide on global warming to be between conservative 
Republicans and liberal Democrats. For instance, in early 2007 the Center found that 
54% of conservative Republicans believed the earth is warming while 92% of liberal 
Democrats did.134 On the other hand, the views of moderate and liberal Republicans, 
independents, and conservative and moderate Democrats were much closer: 78%, 
78%, and 83%, respectively.135  
The implications of these figures are somewhat discouraging. In the modern 
political system, the most difficult race that many candidates for office face is the 
primary within their own party, especially so with respect to the House of 
Representatives. There, the combination of decennial reapportionment, 
sophisticated computer programs, and incumbent self-interest have combined to 
produce election cycles in which the vast majority of seats are safe seats for the 
incumbent. Accordingly, once an incumbent gets to the general election, he or she 
typically can anticipate a relatively easy victory. An incumbent’s biggest electoral 
vulnerability comes in the primary, when turnout is very small and party activists—
conservatives within the Republican party and liberals within the Democratic 
party—can dominate the process. These are the constituencies who are most 
polarized on climate change. Once Congress becomes populated by the selections 
of the activists of their respective parties, it takes on a greater polarization than is 
reflected in the country as a whole. Global warming appears to be one of the issues 
upon which the congressional parties will continue to divide sharply.  
 
 130 See Greenpeace, Don’t Buy ExxonMobil: Stop Global Warming, available at 
http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/usa/press-center/reports4/don-t-buy-exxonmobil-fact-she.pdf 
(explaining ExxonMobil’s massive ad campaign against the United States signing the Kyoto Protocol). 
 131 Robert V. Percival, Skeptical Environmentalist or Statistical Spin-Doctor?: Bjorn Lomborg and 
the Relationship Between Environmental Law and Environmental Progress, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
263, 281 (2002) (“During the late 1960s and early 1970s, public concern for the environment led 
Congress to enact a remarkable set of environmental laws with overwhelming, bipartisan support.”). 
 132 THE PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, A DEEPER PARTISAN DIVIDE OVER 
GLOBAL WARMING 1 (2008), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/417.pdf.  
 133 The Pew Research Center found that 19% of Republicans with a college degree thought that 
global warming was a product of human activity while 31% of Republicans without a college degree 
thought so. The comparable figures for Democrats were 75% and 52%, respectively, and for 
Independents they were 57% and 48%. Id. at 3. 
 134 THE PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, GLOBAL WARMING: A DIVIDE ON 
CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 2 (2007), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/303.pdf. 
 135 Id. 
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The current political climate for action on global warming thus displays a 
number of disadvantages compared to the 1970s: a public less committed and less 
mobilized by a sense of urgency for drastic action, an organized special interest 
opposition, congressional polarization, and a problem on which promises for 
immediate tangible progress—or even tangible progress within a decade—cannot be 
made. None of these characteristics is immutable, except the last, which is directly 
derived from the physical characteristics of the problem we are facing.136 Presidential 
leadership might provide a stimulus for changing one or more of them. During the 
policy window of the 1970s, President Nixon was initially a strong advocate of 
environmental action, as he vied with Senator Edmund Muskie, whom Nixon 
anticipated would be his Democratic challenger in the next presidential election.137 
After the 1970 midterm elections, President Nixon revised his environmental stance, 
becoming more resistant to further programs with their high pricetags.138 By that 
time, however, a bipartisan consensus was in place and it persisted for a number of 
years, so that when Nixon vetoed the 1972 Clean Water Act amendments, Congress 
was able to override his veto.139 The current partisan divide within the Congress on 
environmental questions would make duplicating that feat today quite difficult. 
Should President Obama prove to be as strong an advocate of aggressive climate 
policy as he was on the campaign trail, Congress would find itself being pushed by 
the President for more action—more like President Nixon in his first two years in 
office—rather than having its actions blocked by presidential opposition.  
The nature of the climate change problem will continue to present substantial 
difficulties galvanizing the same degree of heightened public support as was done 
in the 1970s. It will take strong leadership to bring people to the point where they 
make the commitments necessary to accomplish dramatic improvements in our 
carbon footprint, and then repeated leadership to help us stay the course for the 
road ahead. While conditions for successfully addressing climate change do not yet 
have a firm foothold, these conditions can change. The exciting aspect of a 
democratic system is that even one as encrusted with special interest influence as 
ours currently is can be responsive to the broader public voice, as our experiences 
during the 1970s surely demonstrate.  
 
 136 There are a number of speculative strategies for dealing with climate change that operate through 
mechanisms other than reducing greenhouse gas concentrations. Geoengineering strategies, such as 
introducing massive amounts of sulfate aerosols into the atmosphere to prevent solar energy from reaching 
the earth’s surface, would, if they were successful, counteract the effects of increased greenhouse gas 
concentrations instead of lowering the concentrations. See, e.g., COMM. ON SCI., ENG’G, & PUBLIC POLICY, 
THE NAT’L ACADS., POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING 433, 449 (1992). In principle, 
some of these offsetting strategies could work faster than will strategies to stabilize and then lower those 
concentrations. These strategies are quite speculative, however, and none of them are under serious 
consideration for policy action at the present time.  
 137 See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss et al., Regulating by Litigation: The EPA’s Regulation of Heavy-
Duty Diesel Engines, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 403, 465 (2004) (“The Clean Air Act as recreated by the 1970 
Amendments was largely the result of a game of political one-upmanship between Republican President 
Richard Nixon and Democratic Senator Edmund Muskie (D-Me.) . . . .”). 
 138 See, e.g., Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning from More Than Five-and-a-Half Decades of Federal 
Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 527, 
537 n.72 (2005) (noting Nixon vetoed the Refuse Act “because of his opposition to the increase in 
federal funding for publicly owned treatment works”). 
 139 Id. at 537. 
